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Argument

APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS FAIL TO SHOW THAT THE DISTRICT COURT'S
ORDER WAS PROPERLY BASED ON A MATERIAL CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES AS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW, NOR DO THEY SHOW THAT
APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS AND OTHER RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED;
THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S
RULING.
A.

Morkel's argument is in error when she claims that Blocker failed to preserve
the change of circumstances issue on appeal.

Merkel erroneously argues that Blocker failed to preserve the change of circumstances
issue on appeal. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24 requires that the appellant must
provide a showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court. Three elements are required
for preservation. First, the issue must be raised in a timely fashion. Second, the issue must be
specifically raised, and third, the party must introduce evidence or legal authority in support of
the issue. Badger v. Brook!Jn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998).
Blocker did properly preserve the issue below as he demonstrated in his brief. 1 First,
the issue must be raised in a timely fashion. Blocker raised the issue of his objection to the
petition to modify and specifically the lack of specificity in the alleged "material change in
circumstances" during the June 10, 2015 hearing. (R. 6330 p. 9, lines 8-9.) Although he was
cut-off by Judge Taylor before he was able to fully make the substance of his objection clear,
Blocker said, "I would like to express on the record that I strenuously object with that for the
following .... " It is clear from the context of the statement that "that" in Blocker's statement
referred to Judge Taylor's statement that he was going to rule that Markel had shown a
1

Ironically, Morkel's brief even more directly shows the preservation of the issues by directly quoting the
dialogue between Blocker and Judge Taylor that preserves the issue. See Appellee's Brief pages 21-22.
1

material change in circumstances. Second, the issue must be specifically raised. Again, Blocker
attempted to be specific by telling Judge Taylor that he had "reasons" that he wanted to raise.

(See R. 6330 p. 9, line 11.) However, he was cut off by Judge Taylor who immediately
overruled his attempt to speak. Again it is clear from the context that Blocker was attempting
to specifically raise the issue of Taylor's conclusion that Morkel had shown a material change
in circumstance. It would be putting form over substance to reject Blocker's appeal for lack of
preservation at this point simply because Judge Taylor's continuous interruptions of a pro se
party who felt bullied by a judge prevented Blocker from completing his sentence and thus
preventing the "specificity" required by Rule 24. Finally, in compliance with the third
requirement to preserve the issue for review, Blocker next attempted to state the law
governing the issue: "Okay, may I state the law regarding this?" (R. 6330 p. 9, line 13.) As
with his previous attempts he was cut off, being told "No, I'm familiar with the law. That's
my ruling." (R. 6330 p. 9, line 14.) Blocker persisted: "Hogue v. Hogue, you're familiar with
that?" (R. 6330 p. 9, line 15.) Clearly, by raising the issue in a timely matter, with specificity,
and with direct citation to governing law, Blocker preserved the issue on appeal.
B.

Morkel's argument that marshaling applies to this appeal is erroneous because
marshaling only applies to appeals challenging findings of fact.

Morkel contends that all arguments in the Appellant's brief on the merits should be
stricken for failure to marshal evidence; however, Morkel is in error because Utah's marshaling
requirement only applies to appeals challenging findings of fact employing a "clear error"
standard of review, and Blocker does not challenge factual findings. Nowhere in her argument
has Morkel either directly or indirectly argued for such a standard of review. Blocker's appeal
2

challenges a conclusion of law: whether Markel sufficiently proved and the court below was
justified in concluding that she had proved a substantial change in circumstances, which is a
legal conclusion, not a finding of fact. The standard of review Markel asks this Court to adopt
is unclear; in some places she seems to be asking the Court to apply an abuse of discretion
standard while in others she seems to be seeking de novo review, but nowhere does she
invoke a "clear error" review either directly or indirectly by asking this Court to review factual
findings rather than conclusions of law.
Utah's marshaling requirement clearly applies onfy to appeals of findings of fact, subject
to "clear error review," rather than conclusions of law. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007
UT 42 iP 7, 164 P.3d 3. Appellants contesting such factual findings are required to marshal
"'all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in
light of the conflicting and contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence."' Id. (quoting Grace Grilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'm, 776
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
Blocker is not challenging factual findings in this case. The determination of a
"material change in circumstances" for purposes of a modification of a child custody order is
a conclusion of law subject to a de novo, or at best, an abuse of discretion, standard of review.
Nowhere in Utah case law is "clear error" review ever applied to such determinations. Hence,
Morkel's marshaling argument fails.
Even if the Court determines that marshaling does apply in this case, it should be
directed by the Utah Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the marshaling requirement in
State v. Nielsen wherein the Court held that "from here on our analysis will be focused on the
3

ultimate question of where the appellant has established a basis for overcoming a healtl:!J dose of
deference owed to factual findings andjury verditts-and not on whether there is a technical dejicienry in
marshaling meriting a default." State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,I 14, 326 P.3d 645(emphasis added).
C.

Morkel's argument that Judge Taylor's temporary change from supervised to
unsupervised visitation constitutes a legal "material change in circumstances"
upon which the trial court can base its ruling is contrary to the requirements of
U tab Code section 30-3-10.4.

In Morkel's brief she appears to argue that Judge Taylor's temporary change from
supervised to unsupervised visitation constitutes a "material change in circumstances" upon
which the court could later base a ruling to permanently modify the custody award. Such logic
is not only facially disingenuous but completely contrary to Utah law. The standard for the
"material change in circumstances" comes from Utah Code section 30-3-10.4, which states
that a petition to modify must show evidence "that the circumstances of the child or one or
both parents or joint legal or physical custodians have materially and substantially changed
since the entry of the order to be modified." Hence, the "material change in circumstances"
must precede the filing of the petition to modify as it is the basis for the petition. Without such a
change in circumstances, petitioner would have no good-faith basis for the petition in the first
place. Therefore, for Merkel to claim that the temporary change from supervised to
unsupervised visitation that was ordered at the very same hearing where Judge Taylor
converted Morkel's Order to Show Cause to a Petition to Modify constituted the "material
change in circumstance" that supported her Petition to Modify is both factually and legally
impossible: it could not provide the basis for a pleading that did not exist and it could not
provide the required evidence to support such a pleading when it was not in place prior to the
4

creation of the pleading.

D.

Morkel's argument that the ability to substitute unpleaded "relief'' requires the
court to be able to substitute an unpleaded "pleading" is unsupported by Utah
law.

Blocker does not dispute Morkel's argument regarding the court's ability to substitute
unpleaded relief when necessary as she cites in her brief; however, this is quite different from
allowing the court to substitute an unpleaded pleading. Such is not supported by Utah law and
is contrary to principles of fairness as it takes the judge out of his role as impartial arbiter and
into role as adviser for a party, especially when such party is represented by counsel.
Principles of fundamental fairness would support permitting a judge either substituting
or supplementing pleaded relief with additional relief that was not initially sought in a party's
pleadings when that party is legally entitled to such relief but for whatever reason did not seek
it and when without it the injured party would be left either unwhole or the other party would
be left unduly benefited. This, however, is not the same as allowing the judge to interject his
judgment regarding how the party should have strategically approached her case.

If a party files the wrong pleading and is denied, the party can simply file the right
pleading the next time-if the party has the required evidence to support the pleading
standard for that motion etc. No fundamental fairness is lost by requiring the party to do so.
..;.J

On the other hand, allowing a judge to step into the shoes of the attorney and essentially "replead" by converting one pleading into another type (especially when a substantial filing fee is
waived in the process) at the very least taints the proceedings with a flavor of partiality.
In this case nothing would have been lost if Judge Taylor had simply ruled on Morkel's
5

Order to Show Cause as she filed it. She later could have filed a Petition to Modify, if she
chose to do so. 2 Morkel was represented by competent counsel who had filed the pleading
that he and his client felt was appropriate for the matter they wanted to bring before the court.
They supported her Order to Show Cause with the evidence they believed it warranted. They
were not prepared for, nor did they have evidence to support, a Petition to Modify. By sua

sponte converting Morkel's Order to Show Cause into a Petition to Modify,Judge Taylor gave
her more than what she was legally entitled to; he stepped into the role of her legal counsel
and stripped away the impartiality of the proceedings, and for that this Court should reverse
his ruling.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the decision of the district court
and reinstate Judge Davis's Custody Order and give direction to the district court that any
modification to be made is only to substitute conditions for Morkel's unsupervised parent
time that are consistent with the original order. In addition, Blocker requests that this Court
award him the appropriate fees and costs associated with this appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

~chaelBlocker
l~-Pro Se, Appellant
DATE: March 24, 2016

2

It is relevant to note that on the record in court the very day Judge Taylor converted her Order to Show cause
into a Petition to Modify Morkel stated that she was not seeking to modify the custody order.
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